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Abstract
Analysis of Symmetric Key Establishment based on Reciprocal Channel Quantization
David M. Wagner
Supervising Professor: Dr. Gill R. Tsouri

Methods of symmetric key establishment using reciprocal quantization of channel parameters in
wireless Rayleigh and Rician fading channels are considered. Two important aspects are addressed
through generic analysis: impact of a proximity attack by a passive eavesdropper and achievable
key establishing rates. The analysis makes use of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology statistical test suite applied to the channel quantization bits as the outputs of a random
number generator. For proximity attacks, a passive mobile eavesdropper with an ability to
approach one of the communicating parties and a possible signal-to-noise ratio advantage is
assumed. The minimal required distance from the eavesdropper in order to maintain perfect
secrecy during key establishment is evaluated as a function of the Rician factor and quantization
depth. For key establishing rates, the maximal rates are evaluated while ensuring that the generated
secret key bits pass the entire statistical test suite. The generic analysis is applied to channel-phase
quantization and performance in practical systems is considered as well.
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Summary of Contributions

•

Generic approach of analyzing eavesdropper proximity attacks on key establishment
methods that use reciprocal quantization of channel parameters. The analysis
determines the minimal required distance from an eavesdropper to maintain perfect
secrecy while establishing the key.

•

Generic approach of analyzing achievable key refreshing rates for key establishment
methods that use reciprocal quantization of channel parameters. The analysis
determines maximum key establishing rates while insuring that the resulting key is a
true random sequence.

•

Determination of secure eavesdropper-receiver distances and key refreshing rates for
carrier-phase quantization in Rician fading environments.

•

Implementation in Matlab of entire NIST 2008 statistical test suite for Cryptographic
Random Number Generators. The Matlab code would be made available online at:
http://people.rit.edu/grteee/communicationLab.html

•

Publication:
D. Wagner and G. R. Tsouri, “Analysis of Symmetric Key Establishment Based on
Reciprocal Channel Quantization: Proximity Attacks and Key Establishing Rates”,
submitted for review to IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security –
special issue on Physical Layer Security.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The broadcast nature of wireless communication links exposes them to eavesdropping and
therefore securing a wireless link is paramount in many applications. In traditional symmetric
encryption systems, a large pre-deployed secret key is shared by the two communicating parties.
The same key is used to encrypt and decrypt information. A prominent example is the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) [1], where a 128 bit key is typically used. Asymmetric encryption is
based on public-key cryptography where the public key is not secret and is used to encrypt
information. Decryption can only be performed using a private key which is secretly kept. A
prominent example is the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) [2] algorithm. Both types of encryption
methods are based on security by complexity and provide adequate security. Symmetric methods
are characterized by lower algorithmic complexity, while asymmetric methods are characterized
by lower key management complexity. To minimize complexity one could use a simpler
symmetric encryption method such as a stream cipher [3] coupled with periodic key establishing to
compensate for its weak encryption strength. To this end a method of securely establishing a
symmetric encryption key is needed. A prominent method used in practice is the Diffie-Hellman
algorithm [4] which reintroduces high algorithmic complexity.
AES and the Diffie-Hellman algorithm involve the use of considerable online computation
power, memory space and communication overhead. Therefore, these methods could prove
impractical in resource-constrained devices such as implanted medical devices, compact mobile
devices and wireless enabled bio-sensors. The costs associated with securing a wireless link in
resource-constrained devices received considerable attention in the past – see [5] for example. A
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low-complexity alternative for establishing a symmetric key is attractive provided that it is secure
from eavesdropping. Such an alternative would allow the use of low-complexity symmetric
encryption coupled with frequent key establishment.

1.2 Literature Survey
In recent years there has been increased attention to the use of wireless physical layer security to
establish information theoretic security as a low cost alternative to standard encryption methods
which are based on computational complexity such as AES. Previous work on the secrecy capacity
of wireless fading channels showed they have an intrinsic property of concealing information from
an eavesdropper – see [6-12] for prominent examples. In addition, the literature depicts many
attempts to practically use the secrecy-capacity to implement information theoretic security - see
[13-21] and references therein for examples. We focus our attention on methods of symmetric key
generation based on reciprocal quantization of channel parameters such as those reported in
[15-21]. In [15] knowledge of the channel-phase is used to encrypt data with some arbitrary
quantization. In [16] reciprocal random fluctuations in the signal amplitudes are quantized to
generate keys. In [17] key generating is simulated for ultra wideband channels, while in [18-21]
the channel phase and/or amplitudes are directly quantized to generate secret key bits.

1.3 Novelty
In this contribution we propose two generic analysis approaches applicable to key establishment
methods which are based on reciprocal quantization of channel parameters. The first approach is
for assessing the impact of proximity attacks by a mobile passive eavesdropper with possible
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Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) advantage. The second approach is for evaluating achievable key
establishing rates. For the scope of this work we consider Rician fading channels, a passive
eavesdropper, and no quantization errors. Note that quantization errors and key establishing rates
are intimately tied, since failures to establish a key due to quantization errors means the
communicating parties must perform multiple attempts to establish the key resulting in slower
establishing rates. It follows that the analysis results in an upper bound on key establishment rates.
Our analysis makes use of the Rician channel model reported in [22], the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) random number generator test suite [23], a supporting lemma
we define and prove, and Clarke’s Rayleigh channel model in [24]. The model in [22] offers high
accuracy with regard to the random nature of the Rician factor and was successfully used in the
past to model Rician fading channels, and the NIST test suite [23] is used extensively to evaluate
many cryptographic random number generators. We are unaware of previous attempts to use the
NIST test suite to quantitatively evaluate the limits of key generating methods based on channel
randomness. As an example, we apply the generic approach to key establishment based on single
antenna reciprocal channel-phase quantization and use the result to evaluate the applicability for
practical systems and standards.

1.4 Outline
Chapter 2 details the foundational concepts in cryptography and information theory required for
analysis. Chapter 3 presents analysis of proximity attacks and key refreshing rates in a strong
multipath environment with no line-of-sight (based on Clarke’s Rayleigh fading model) and in
multipath with line-of-sight channels (based on the novel Pop-Beaulieu [22] Rician fading model).
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We consider the three Industrial-Scientific-Medical (ISM) frequency bands around 433MHz,
915MHz and 2.45GHz. Chapter 4 concludes the treatment and provides direction for future work.
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Chapter 2: Background
2.1 Theoretic Secrecy
Most secrecy systems today rely on practical security by using a large key; for example AES
uses a 128-bit key. For these systems, a brute force attack by an eavesdropper would require
exhaustive search through 2

different possible keys. Even with today’s computational

resources, the search duration would exceed the system’s lifetime. However, these systems can
theoretically be compromised since the eavesdropper gains a modicum of information from each
ciphertext sample available to him.
In 1946, Claude Shannon published a seminal paper [25] on secrecy systems which addresses
achieving theoretic secrecy in the presence of an eavesdropper with unlimited resources. In a
keyspace

   , a message space     , and a cryptogram space     , the
||

||

||

function  is a rule that assigns elements of  to elements of . For theoretic secrecy, the

probability of  occurring must be the same as the probability of  occurring given that any 

occurred previously, or  ! "  ! ". Therefore, two conditions must be met: || # || and

| | # ||. If both of these are met, we may construct a mapping  that ensures  ! " 

! ". All plaintext messages are equiprobable and so the eavesdropper may not glean any

information from any individual ciphertext, and therefore from unlimited ciphertexts.

In most practical systems | | $ || and so  ! " % ! ". In this case, by intercepting a

cryptogram the eavesdropper will obtain information about the probability distribution of the
messages. The unicity distance is defined in [25] as the number of cryptograms required by the
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eavesdropper to uniquely determine the message by using cryptanalysis. In systems without
theoretic secrecy, the unicity distance is a finite number.

Fig. 1 – Communication System with Eavesdropper

In Fig. 1, we apply the concept of theoretic secrecy to a wireless communication system. An
eavesdropper (Eve) is attempting to understand the communication between the transmitter
(Alice) and the receiver (Bob). The channel formed between Alice and Bob is designated &'() ,
and the channel between Alice and Eve is &*+ . Since the communication is over-the-air, Eve is

able to receive the signal with her antenna. The secrecy capacity of the Alice-Bob channel is
defined as the maximum quantity of information that may be transmitted over the channel with
theoretic secrecy. Previous work [9] has shown the secrecy capacity of the Alice-Bob channel to
be
,-  .

, /, ;
0;

, 1, 3
, $,

!1"

where ,*+ designates the channel capacity in [bits/Sec] of Eve’s channel and ,'() represents the
channel capacity of Bob’s channel. For a Gaussian Identity [9] Channel, we have
:
,  log 81 9 <
;

!2"
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where > denotes the Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) in which S is signal power and N is noise power.
=

For a wireless channel, this relation is invalid because of the multipath, but C is still proportional to

SNR. Assuming Eve has unlimited resources, she can design an optimum antenna and have a

signal with extremely high SNR, and therefore CCDE F ∞. This would indicate that theoretic
secrecy is impossible with a powerful eavesdropper. However, the relation in (1) does not hold if
hCDE and hIJ are independent [21]. If the channels are independent, Eve’s unicity distance will
remain at infinity even if she gains an arbitrarily large SNR advantage.

2.2 Random Number Generators
A True Random Number Generator (TRNG) is an information source whose instantaneous
outputs are selected from the states of an underlying random process. TRNGs are often based on
observations of physical phenomena, for example the alpha emissions in a radioactive decay
process, and measurements of atmospheric noise. Humans have many applications for TRNGs,
including Monte-Carlo simulations of physical phenomena, random sampling among a population,
generation of keys in cryptography, selecting lottery winners, and even for creation of content in
the arts. However, harnessing physical processes is challenging and often does not provide the
demanded quantity of random data. Also, the concept of randomness is counterintuitive to the
human brain and thus cannot be synthesized by man. Therefore, humans have thoroughly
investigated and developed deterministic means of approximating TRNGs. These generators are
termed Pseudo Random Number Generators (PRNG). PRNGs produce a stream of numbers that
strive to emulate properties of randomness. Starting with an initial number seed, each next number
is generated by a deterministic transformation on the previous number.
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A simple example of a PRNG is a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR [26]). The LFSR of

order K generates each n-bit number as a function of the previous number according to the
exclusive or (XOR) gate connections between the registers. Depending on the initial seed, the
LFSR progresses through different cycles of states. A LFSR which produces a maximal length

sequence of 2L / 1 is called an m-sequence generator. The XOR connections of any m-sequence
generator correspond to a primitive polynomial.
Another simple PRNG is the Linear Congruential Generator (LCG) [26], which generates
subsequent numbers as residues of the previous number weighted and shifted by a constant value.

Its deterministic expression is MLN  OML 9 P !QR ", and it starts with a seed MS. Even with
carefully chosen values for O, P, , MS the sequence has a period of at most .

PRNGs can also be complex, consisting of a series of cumbersome deterministic
transformations. One example is the Mersenne-Twister algorithm [27], which is currently
implemented in Matlab as the rand() function. The Mersenne-Twister algorithm is a
computationally intensive PRNG which has a period of 2

TTUV

/ 1.

In some cases, it is desirable to have pseudo-randomness rather than pure randomness. For
example, in Code-Division-Multiple-Access (CDMA) systems, Pseudo-Noise (PN) spreading
sequences are used for coding and decoding messages for an individual user.
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2.3 Random Number Generator Evaluators
Due to the high demand for random data, much research has been conducted on identifying
previously untapped TRNGs and also on creating new PRNGs. Since humans cannot intuitively
judge randomness, a need has arisen for RNG assessors which accurately determine where a
particular RNG stands on the spectrum between deterministic and random. Humans do understand
properties of deterministic sequences, and so these assessors are designed to filter out RNGs that
generate sample sequences with deterministic properties. Typically, the assessors consist of a
battery of tests, each of which detects a different type of underlying determinism or predictability.
One such RNG assessor is the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) statistical
test suite [23].The NIST statistical test suite consists of multiple tests designed to evaluate the
effectiveness of a RNG which is specifically meant for use in cryptographic applications. The suite
consists of 15 unique tests, each of which judges the randomness of an incoming bitstream, and
returns one or more P-values. These values are typically obtained by transforming the input
sequence and observing some properties of it, and then performing a chi-squared test to compare to
the expected properties of a truly random sequence. The chi-squared test ensures that the sum of
probabilistically weighted squares of the differences between the observed and expected values is
less than a certain threshold. Statistically, the P-values represent the strength of the evidence
against the null hypothesis; which is that the sequence is nonrandom. For each P-value, the

sequence is statistically random with a significance level of α if PDYZ[E # α. However, a Type I
error can occur if a random sequence produces a P-value below the significance level. Also, a
nonrandom sequence may occasionally produce a P-value which passes, which is a Type II Error.
In order to reduce the effect of these statistical errors, NIST specifies [23] that at least \ sequences
be tested. To determine whether a generator is indeed random, one may either conduct a chi-square
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test on the produced P-values to assess their uniformity, or simply observe whether the percentage
of passing P-values is above a specified threshold determined by α.

The NIST tests are not completely independent in terms of the aspects of non-randomness they
catch. They also don’t span the entire testing space, since no battery of tests could conclusively
prove that a sequence is random. Nonetheless, they are the industry standard of RNG and PRNGs,
especially for those generators to be used in cryptographic applications.
Test
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11,12
13
14, 15
16-23
24-41

Test Title
Frequency
Block Frequency
Runs
Longest-run-of-ones in a block
Binary Matrix Rank
Discrete Fourier Transform
Non-overlapping Template Matching
Overlapping Template Matching
Maurer's "Universal Statistical"
Linear Complexity
Serial
Approximate Entropy
Cumulative Sums
Random Excursions
Random Excursions Variant
Tab. 1 – NIST statistical tests

Tab. 1 shows a list of the tests available in the suite. Each test is designed to filter out a different
kind of non-randomness. The Frequency test is the simplest one and can be used as a filter before
applying any of the other tests. It detects whether the distribution of zeros to ones is uniform
enough for randomness. The Block Frequency test assesses the uniformity of the bits in local
blocks which are subsets of the bitstream. The Runs test detects abnormally large or small streaks
of ones, and the Longest-run-of-ones-in-a-Block test is a local version of this test within blocks.
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The Spectral test rejects sequences that have repetitive patterns. The Template Matching tests
detect whether the frequency of occurrence of a specified bit sequence is atypical of that of a
random sequence. The Universal Statistical test determines if the sequence’s entropy is consistent
with its length, i.e. if the sequence cannot be compressed. The Linear Complexity test determines
whether the length of the sequence’s generator linear feedback shift register is too small. The
Serial test judges the uniformity of the distribution of overlapping subsequences of a certain
length, and returns two P-values based on different sequence indices. The Approximate Entropy
test employs a different method to test the same aspect of non-randomness as the Serial test. The
Cumulative Sums test detects whether there a certain value is over-represented at the extremities
of the sequence. It returns a P-value for traversing through the sequence forward and for traversing
backward. The Random Excursions test creates a random walk out of the sequence, and examines
the frequency of occurrence for each of 8 states, returning a P-value for every state. The Random
Excursions Variant test creates multiple random walks and measures the occurrence rate of each of
18 states, also returning a P-value for every state.
NIST has a website [28] where one may download ANSI C implementation of the test suite. In
order to better understand the tests in the suite, we wrote a Matlab implementation of each test.
Several challenges were encountered in this pursuit. The biggest challenge was encountered with
the Linear Complexity test, which required coding a binary version of the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm [29]. This algorithm detects the smallest size LFSR able to generate the given sequence.
Finding the minimal LFSR for a sequence requires on the order of K bit operations [26], where K
is the sequence length. The test required dividing the sequence of length at least K  10] into ;

blocks of  bits each, whereK  ;, 500 _  _ 5000 and ; # 200. The Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm would then be run on each block and a table of minimal LFSR would be constructed,
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after which a chi-squared test would be conducted on the table. Ignoring any processing associated
with the chi-squared test, this test requires quadratic complexity with a constant times `! " a ;

bit operations. In the best case, this corresponds to `!500 " a 2000 bit operations. On a

3cde 32-bit architecture CPU with the maximum 2cf of Random Access Memory allocated to

Matlab, this test took an average of approximately 8 seconds to execute, compared with a fraction
of a second required by each other test on average. Evaluating a RNG with a significance level of

0.01 requires generating 100 sequences and running every test on each sequence. Therefore, the
additional delay incurred by the Linear Complexity test drastically increased the time of a large
amount of simulations.
In order to test the correctness of the Matlab implementation, we subjected random and
deterministic sequences to the newly implemented tests. For the random sequence we used data
from the Random.org [30] TRNG, which is based on atmospheric noise. We requested data in

blocks of 10h bits until accumulating enough for a sequence of length 10] . For the deterministic
data we used a LFSR of length 27 with gate connections corresponding to the polynomial
19i

V

9i

9i

U

9i

V

to generate a sequence of length 2

V

/ 1. We used 10 bits of this

data to form 100 sequences of length 10] . The Matlab implementation passed the sequence
harvested from Random.org, and it failed the sequences generated by the LFSR.
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Chapter 3: Analysis
3.1 Opening Remarks
We consider the scenario depicted in Fig. 1, where two communicating parties (Alice and Bob)
are establishing a key using reciprocal quantization of some channel parameter by alternating the
roles of transmitter and receiver. The eavesdropper (Eve) performs a proximity attack in attempt to
decipher the key by approaching Bob or Alice during key establishment. Other than approaching
one of the communicating parties, the eavesdropper is passive. We consider the distance of the
eavesdropper from the current receiver, who is attempting to establish a key.
We assume that some efficient method is used by both legitimate communicating parties to
accurately estimate a channel parameter. Following the assumptions made in [12-21], we too
assume that the channel is reciprocal for sufficient time such that the transmitter and receiver
estimate the same value. The channel estimate is quantized with an arbitrary quantization depth to
generate encryption key bits. The process is periodically repeated to generate the necessary
amount of secret bits to form the encryption key. For the sake of analysis, we consider each bit of
the quantization separately as if the key is generated by accumulating a single bit per quantized
estimate.
We assume that the reciprocal key generating method being used is designed such that maximal
key entropy is achieved, i.e., all possible keys are equally probable [27]. This means that the
probability for any generated key bit to be zero or one is the same. This could translate to
performing non-uniform quantization depending on the Probability Density Function (PDF) of the
parameter being quantized. In addition, note that since the eavesdropper and receiver are in close
proximity their fading channel statistics are expected to be the same. We regard the quantized
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channel parameter estimate at the receiver as a binary vector of f secret key bits denoted by

jk  l m ,  m , … , 'm o.

Since we require perfect secrecy during key establishment and key establishing rates which
remain secure, we decouple analysis of proximity attacks and key establishing rates. In what
follows, we assume a secure key establishing rate is used when performing analysis of proximity
attacks, and that sufficient space separation between receiver and eavesdropper is in place when
performing analysis of key establishing rates.

3.1.1 Proximity Attacks
In most reported work on symmetric key generation, it was assumed that the eavesdropper is
sufficiently distanced from the intended receiver so that the channel from transmitter to receiver is
independent of the channel from transmitter to eavesdropper [13-20]. Under this assumption,
channel estimates at the receiver are unique and the eavesdropper is blocked access to them due to
space selectivity of the wireless channel, resulting in independent channels and therefore perfect
secrecy for key establishment. In a real world scenario, an eavesdropper can make an attempt to
near the intended receiver and compromise the basic assumption of independent channel
estimates. In other words, the eavesdropper can perform a proximity attack to reduce the space
selectivity of the wireless channel. As a result the eavesdropper would be able to gain knowledge
of the channel estimates at the receiver based on its own channel estimates and thereby deduce the
key being established with some certainty. In an extreme scenario the eavesdropper could attach its
antenna to that of the receiver so that they would experience the same channel with the transmitter.
This implies that an effective proximity attack would hinder any practical method based on
channel randomness. The question is: what is the minimal required distance of an intended
receiver from a potential eavesdropper to securely establish the key? An analysis of security
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strength in the face of proximity attacks is crucial for evaluating the efficacy of encryption
methods based on channel randomness and for promoting their possible acceptance as alternatives
to traditional methods.
There is limited reported work on the vulnerability of practical symmetric key generation
methods using channel randomness in the presence of a proximity attack. The most relevant work
to date was recently reported in [21], where a measurement campaign was conducted to evaluate
the limits of key establishment based on reciprocal quantization of Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output
(MIMO) channels in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. In [21] information theoretic analysis
is used to find the percent of vulnerable secret bits out of the total number of generated bits as a
function of the distance between eavesdropper and receiver. The difference in SNR of the channels
to eavesdropper and receiver, the number of multipath components, presences of line of sight and
number of antenna being used are considered as system parameters and affect the ratio of
vulnerable secret bits.
In this contribution we present a generic approach to evaluate the effect of proximity attacks on
any practical method which makes use of reciprocal quantization of channel parameters. Our
generic approach evaluates the minimum required distance between receiver (either one on the
communicating parties) and eavesdropper for such methods to remain secure, regardless of a
possible SNR advantage of the eavesdropper and the number of antennas being used. The analysis
results in a threshold on the required separation between eavesdropper and the communicating
parties to achieve perfect secrecy for key establishment as a function of the Rician factor and
quantization depth. Such absolute thresholds are useful for practical systems where the channel
environment changes dynamically resulting in variable and unknown SNR advantage for the
eavesdropper or when the number of antennas at the eavesdropper is unknown.
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3.1.2 Key Establishing Rates
Key establishment rates received considerable attention in the past [6-21]. In general, the
achievable key refreshing rates depend on channel decorrelation in time. If key refreshing rates are
too fast, the channel doesn’t decorrelate sufficiently to ensure that successive channel estimates
and subsequent generated secret bits are uncorrelated. The strength of the key is diminished if
successive secret bits are correlated. Past reported work on achievable key refreshing rates applied
an information-theoretic approach based on the secrecy capacity. Using this approach, the
achievable key rates largely depend on channel conditions. For example, in a single antennas
system if the capacity of the channel from transmitter to eavesdropper is higher than that from
transmitter to receiver, the secrecy capacity is zero and secure key establishment is not possible.
In this contribution we present a generic approach to evaluate achievable key establishing rates of
practical methods making use of reciprocal quantization of channel parameters. We treat the
sequence of generated secret bits as the output of a Random Number Generator (RNG). Assuming
the eavesdropper is sufficiently far from the communicating parties to render a proximity attack
ineffective, we are left with the need to validate the output of our channel-based RNG. To this end
we use the NIST statistical test suite [23] in its entirety as was previously done for other novel
RNGs.

3.2 Analysis of Key Establishing Rates in Rayleigh fading
We use Clarke’s Rayleigh fading model, assuming the channel is narrowband with infinite
scattering [24]. The received signal can be decomposed into in-phase and quadrature components,
which are on different dimensions and are therefore independent.
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The autocorrelation function in time of the components is [24]
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where  and - respectively indicate the in-phase and quadrature components of the received

signal, m denotes the received power, and JS indicates the zero-order Bessel Function of the first
kind.

After sampling the components in (3) and (4) with period T , the goal is to obtain the vector of
z

channel parameter samples    . To this end, we define the following covariance matrix of the
jointly normal elements in the quadrature component:
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Since both components are drawn from this distribution, we may use (8) to independently generate
samples of  and - . We may then extract a channel parameter by applying a function to these

components. In the case studied in this work, we would extract the phase and perform
quantization. This would verify the results of using the Rician model for

 0.
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3.3 Analysis of Proximity Attacks in Rayleigh fading
In order to incorporate decorrelation across distance, we invoke a low-pass equivalent model for
the correlation between two antennas in a diversity system [18]

2R
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¤
¥ 

R RP
 .
¤


!10"
!11"

This model assumes no correlation in time, so we set ¦-  1§P to eliminate correlation of
samples in time. This is justified for a case when the devices wait long enough for the channel to
de-correlate before estimating the next key bit. This leads to
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assuming m  ª z
  1. We define the following vectors of component samples, in which
samples of the received components and samples of the eavesdropper components are generated:
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We form the new covariance matrix
, m+  ®
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Due to space-time independence, (15) generates random variables in the form of (13) and (14).

Once again, after obtaining Z² , Z² , ZE , ZE we may apply a given function to Z² , Z² and to ZE , ZE

to obtain a channel parameter. If the parameter is phase, we could compare to the results from the
Rician case where K  0.
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3.4 Analysis of Proximity Attacks in Rician fading
We use the time-based model given in [22] to describe the varying channel in space. This is
justified due to the channel duality between space and time [23]. We use the following variable
translation between space and time:

R
  r
¤

!16"

where ¤ is the wavelength associated with the frequency of operation, is the maximal Doppler

shift and ´  2 . This equivalency is also evident in [24] for the Rayleigh fading scenario.
Further discussion on space-time duality in wireless channels is given in [31].
Using the model in [22] and we form the space-based model:
 !R" 

√z

- !R" 

∑z
L cos ·

√z

∑z
L sin ·

¸¥
¹

PQ§!tL "º 9 »L " 9 √ cos ·

¸¥
¹

√1 9

PQ§!tL º 9 »L " 9 √ sin ·
√1 9

¸¥
¹

¸¥
¹

cos!¼S " 9 »S º

cos!¼S " 9 »S º

!17"
!18"

where  !R" and - !R" represent the in-phase and quadrature components respectively at the

eavesdropper, R is distance in meters,

is the Rician Factor, ; is the number of multipath

components, ¼S is the angle-of-arrival of the Line of Sight (LoS) component, »S is the initial phase

of the LoS component, »L  are the initial phases of the scattered components, andtL  are the
angles-of-arrival of the scattered components. Note that the model in (17) and (18) allows for
evaluating the correlation between any two points in space. This is useful for modeling single as
well as multiple antenna scenarios.

The quantized channel parameter estimate at the eavesdropper is denoted by the vector j½ 

l + ,  + , … , '+ o. If j½ and jk are independent the eavesdropper would not be able to deduce jk .
We define the following binary random variable:
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!19"

Δ  m ¿ +

where ¿ is the modulo 2 sum operation (exclusive or) and is chosen out of 1, … f to reflect a
specific bit in the quantized binary vector.

3.4.1 Supporting Lemma for ensuring independent eavesdropper channels
Let M and À be discrete binary random variables each uniformly distributed and let   M ¿ À.
Mand À are independent if and only if  is uniformly distributed.

Proof:

Uniformity of M and À means that their PDFs are given by

1
1
Á !i"  ° 9 °Â
2
2

1
1
Ã !Ä"  Å 9 ÅÂ
2
2

It follows that

Á !0"  Á !1"  Ã !0"  Ã !1" 

!20"
1
2

 is 0 only if M and À have the same value. Using the joint PDF of M and ÀÁ,Ã !i, Ä" gives
 !0"  Á,Ã !1,1" 9 Á,Ã !0,0"

 !1"  Á,Ã !0,1" 9 Á,Ã !1,0"

!21"
!22"

!23"

Using marginalization and the discrete nature of M and À to derive Á !i" and Ã !Ä" from
Á,Ã !i, Ä" we have

Ç

Á !i"  Æ Á,Ã !i, Ä" RÄ  Á,Ã !i, 1" 9 Á,Ã !i, 0"
ÂÇ
Ç

Ã !Ä"  Æ Á,Ã !i, Ä" Ri  Á,Ã !1, Ä" 9 Á,Ã !0, Ä"
ÂÇ

!24"
!25"
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 Á !1"  Á,Ã !1,1" 9 Á,Ã !1,0"
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1
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2

!27"

1
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!29"

1
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Equating (26) with (27) and (28) with (29) respectively results in the following symmetries
Á,Ã !0,0"  Á,Ã !1,1"

Á,Ã !1,0"  Á,Ã !0,1"

!31"

Using (30) in (22) and (31) in (23) gives

 !0"  2Á,Ã !1,1"  2Á,Ã !0,0"

!32"

 !1"  2Á,Ã !0,1"  2Á,Ã !1,0"

Case I. Assuming uniformity of  means that

 !1"   !0" 

Using (34) in (22) and (23) gives

It follows that Á,Ã !i, Ä" is given by
Á,Ã !i, Ä" 

Using (20) in (36) gives
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so M and À are independent.
Case II. Assuming independence between M and À means that
Á,Ã !i, Ä"  Á !i"Ã !Ä"

Using (20) in (38) gives

1
1
1
1
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2
2
2

!39"

1
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4
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which is equivalent to
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4
4
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4

Using (40) in (22) and (23) results in

so  is uniformly distributed.

 !0"   !0" 

1
2

!41"
È

The quantized bits are binary random variables, each uniformly distributed. It follows from

Lemma 1 that if Δ is uniform, m and + are independent and the eavesdropper can gain no
knowledge on the established key bit by observing its own channel estimates.

In order to test uniformity of Δ, we invoke the NIST statistical test suite [23]. Using the channel

model, we generate a bitstream of a single bit position of Δ for a given distance, and then apply
the NIST frequency monobit test to the bitstream. The frequency monobit test assesses the
uniformity of a binary random variable. If the proportion pass-rate exceeds the threshold
determined by the sequence length, the bit position of Δ is considered to be uniformly distributed.

30

It follows that the eavesdropper’s key observations are independent to those of the receiver and the
eavesdropper can gain no knowledge of the generated key. This means that the space selectivity of
the wireless channel determined by the distance between eavesdropper and receiver is sufficient to
securely generate an encryption key by quantizing the channel estimates.

3.5 Analysis of Key Establishing Rates in Rician fading
Consecutive samples of a single bit from the quantized channel parameter comprise a random bit
sequence which is the secret key. We apply the entire NIST test suite from Tab. 1 to the bit
sequence per quantization bit as if it originated from a RNG.
In order to formulate a testing strategy, we observe the channel in-phase and quadrature
autocorrelation functions in the time-based Rician fading channel model in [22]:
ÉÊÊ ! "  ÉË Ë ! " 

S !´¥ " 9 PQ§!´¥ PQ§ !¼S "
292

!42"

Where S is the first kind Bessel function of the zeroth order. We plot these functions as a function
time normalized to the Doppler shift and

Ì l0, 1, 3,5,10o in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 –Rician channel correlation in time

The randomness of the phase for a particular sampling period is related to the component
autocorrelation value at that time. We observe that sampling at a zero crossings in Fig. 2 would
produce a channel estimate which it completely uncorrelated with the previous channel estimate.
In an ideal world, we would sample at this zero-crossing and achieve an extremely high key refresh
rate. However, sampling precisely at the zero-crossing would require impractical precision. For

example, a Doppler shift of 100 de would produce a period in the phase decorrelation function
of10§.We assume the worst case of sampling on a peak or trough. Thus, for a particular Rician
channel, we must extract and test the sequence of sampling periods corresponding to the extrema
of the autocorrelation functions. For each sampling period a sequence of quantized channel

estimates is generated using f bits per estimate. The quantized estimates are partitioned into
separate sequences of random bits each corresponding to a specific bit in the

32
quantization l m ,  m , … , 'm o. Each such sequence is evaluated using the entire NIST statistical test
suite. The smallest extrema which passes all NIST tests is the smallest secure sampling period,
since a small sampling offset would not increase the correlation across samples. The inverse of this
sampling period is the maximum secret bit generating rate of a specific quantized bit position and
is denoted É)ÍÎÏ .

3.6 Carrier-phase Quantization
We now apply the two generic approaches to key establishing based on reciprocal quantization of
the channel-phase. We assume that an accurate estimation method is used by both parties to
accurately estimate the fading channel phase, using signals going back and forth in rapid
succession [13-21]. The phase estimate is quantized to generate encryption key bits. The process is
periodically repeated to generate the necessary amount of secret bits to form the encryption key.
Given a sampled channel phase –  $ ¼ !K¦" _ , we shift and scale to
¼Ñ lKo 

¼ !K¦" 9 
2

and uniformly quantize these phases into B bits per phase,
¼| 

Ó¼ ÔlKo a 2' Õ
.
2'

!43"
!44"

3.6.1 Proximity Attacks using Carrier-Phase Quantization
The phase at the eavesdropper and receiver is given respectively by
- !R"
¼+  tanÂ Ø
Ù
 !R"

and

!45"
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¼m  tanÂ Ø

- !RS "
Ù
 !RS "

!46".

In order to generate the phase of a Rician fading channel, we first generate the received in-phase
and quadrature components. Loosely stated, if the sign of - and  are considered, full phase

mapping is obtained and ¼+ , ¼m Ì l/, ". The phases are uniformly quantized to obtain j½ and jk ,

where f  6 bits.

Without loss of generality we assume the eavesdropper and receiver are at a distance of R and RS

respectively from some reference point placed on a straight line going through receiver and
eavesdropper positions, and that the receiver is at the reference position (RS  0). For distances
R and RS , we used ;  8 multipath components, which was shown in [22] to be a sufficient

number of components to model the channel. The frequency monobit test requires a bitstream
length of at least 100, and a significance level of t  0.01 requires Ú  100 bitstreams. We
generated 10Û phases, which we then quantized to f  6 bits. We formed Δ and generated

1000 bitstreams of sequence length 100 for each of the 6 bit-positions, which were then input into
the NIST frequency monobit test.

For generality we normalize the distance R by the carrier wavelength ¤. We considered a

normalized distance of 0 $

¥
¹

_ 1, assuming the eavesdropper is always able to be within a

wavelength of the receiver. We found the largest distance in this range for which the NIST
monobit test failed. The distance up to the failing distance is the minimal required distance to

securely generate the key and is noted RL . If a distance of R  ¤ failed the NIST test, we
declare key generation as a failure.
The aforementioned strategy was executed on each of the 6 quantized bit-positions with
Ì l0,10o. Fig. 3 shows the results. For brevity we omit failed attempts (RL 1 ¤) from the
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graph. It is apparent that as

increases RL increases as well. This is because a higher

results

in less multipath and hence less randomness of the channel. We observe that deeper quantization
bits help increase RL . This is because deeper quantization bits are sensitive to smaller channel

variations across space. As long as the quantization noise is tolerable, the loss of channel
randomness due to high

can be compensated by using a deeper quantization bit. Note the

discrete levels of RL for varying .This is a manifestation of the hard-decision threshold output

of the NIST frequency monobit test and is useful for determining clear requirements for RL as a
function of .

Fig. 3– Minimum required distance as function of Rician factor for various quantization bits

The results in Fig. 3 help determine how far a receiver must be from the eavesdropper to foil a

proximity attack in practical systems. For example, transmission in the ISM bands 2.45cde,
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915de and 434de correspond to a wavelength of 12.2P , 32.7P and 69.1P
respectively. The third Most Significant Bit (MSB#3) of the phase quantization can be used
for

$ 1if the receiver is at least 2.5P, 6.6P and 13.8P away from the eavesdropper for

2.45cde , 915de and 434de respectively.If MSB#4 is used the same distances ensure
security for

$ 6. If MSB#4is used in a2.45cde IEEE 802.15.4 system and the channel is

known to be Rician fading with

_ 8 a distance of at least 7.5P between receiver and

eavesdropper is required. These distances seem reasonable for many practical systems. For

quantization depth higher than five bits the required distance is below ¤/10, which corresponds to a
minimal distance of 1.2P , 3.3P and 6.9P for 2.45cde , 915de and 434de

respectively.

3.6.2 Key Establishing Rates using Carrier-Phase Quantization
The channel-phase using the time model in [22] is given by
¼ !K¦"  tanÂ Ø

- !K¦"
Ù ; K  1,2, … , e
 !K¦"

!47"

We observe that (47) generates a sequence of consecutive phase of length e. We generate  total
number of sequences of length z. We scale and quantize these phases according to (45) and (46).
After quantizing, we have a matrix of bits of size m by e by f. We select a bit position Ý _ f and

reshape the data into m bitstreams of length e.

We ran Monte Carlo analysis over a sweep of phase sampling period ¦- . We took a quantization

depth of f  8 bits since that is a conservative estimate of common Analog to Digital Converter

(ADC) depths. We set the number of multipaths equal to ;  8 as was done previously in [22].
We set the bit positions to Ý Ì l3, 4, 5, 6,7,8o and the Rician factors to

Ì l0, 1, 3, 5, 10o. We then

applied the NIST test suite with sequence length e  10] so that we could execute all the tests. We
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used a significance level t  0.01 , requiring   Ú  100 sequences. Tab. 2 shows the
parameters used for the tests.

Test
Block Frequency
Longest Run of Ones
Binary Matrix Rank

Parameter

Value

block size

100000

# blocks

10

block size

10000

# blocks

75

# matrix rows

32

# matrix cols

32

# blocks

8

Non-overlapping Template Matching block size

125000

template size

9

Template

000000001

template size

9

Template

000000001

block length

7

# blocks

1280

block length

1000

degrees of freedom

7

Serial

block length

3

Approximate Entropy

block length

2

Random Excursions

States

{-4..-1}{1..4}

Overlapping Template Matching
Maurer's "Universal Statistical"
Linear Complexity

Random Excursions Variant
States
Tab. 2 – Parameters for NIST tests

{-9..-1}{1..9}

We determined É)ÍÎÏ  1/¦- , which simultaneously meets the randomness threshold for every

test, across the aforementioned space of ! , Ý". For generality, time is normalized by the Doppler
shift. Fig. 4 shows the results.
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Fig. 4 – Maximum key refreshing rates as a function of quantized bit position for K  l0,1,3,5,10o.
We note that É)ÍÎÏ varies inversely with , since a higher

increases the ratio between LoS and

scattered power resulting in reduced randomness. We also observe that É)ÍÎÏ increases with a

higher Ý, since a deeper quantization bit is more sensitive to small variation of the channel over
time.
The results in Fig. 4 are useful for determining achievable key establishing rates in practical
systems. For example, consider a stationary scenario with no LoS (

 0), where changing

environment corresponds to a low Doppler shift of   5de. In such a scenario, one may attain

the following key refresh rates:4 i 10Â

){-+

a 5  0.2 -+ using :f #6 and 5 i 10Â
){-

){-+

a5

2.5 -+ using :f #7 . This means that it would take 320§P to establish a 64 bit key
){-
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usingonly :f #6 , and 25.6§P to establish the same key using only :f #7 .As another
example, consider a mobile vehicular environment corresponding to   100de with a LoS
component corresponding to

 10. In such a scenario, using only :f #7 to establish a 128

bit key would require 10Âh a 100 a 128  1.28§P.
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Chapter 4: Conclusion
4.1 Closing Remarks
Symmetric key establishment using reciprocal quantization of channel parameters in wireless
Rician fading channels was considered. Two aspects were addressed through generic analysis:
impact of a proximity attack by a passive yet mobile eavesdropper with possible SNR advantage
and achievable key establishing rates. Analysis made rigorous use of the NIST statistical test suite
applied to the channel quantization bits as the outputs of a random number generator. The analysis
was applied to channel-phase quantization and performance in practical systems was considered as
a special case.
For proximity attacks, the NIST frequency monobit test was used in conjuncture with a lemma
that was defined and proved. The minimal required distance from the eavesdropper in order to
maintain perfect secrecy during key establishment was evaluated as a function of the Rician factor
and quantization depth. The analysis proved useful for determining the required distance from the

eavesdropper to securely establish the key. For example, in the ISM bands 2.45cde, 915de and

434deperfect secrecy is achieved for environments with a Rician factor of

_ 8 by using

:f #5 with a minimum receiver-eavesdropper distance of 6.9P, 3.3P, and 1.2P
respectively.

For key establishing rates, we assumed that a proximity attack is not possible, i.e., the
eavesdropper is sufficiently far from the legitimate parties. The maximal achievable key
establishment rates were evaluated by treating a given quantization bit of the channel phase as a
cryptographic RNG and applying the complete NIST statistical test suite to its output bitstream.
The analysis proved useful for evaluating achievable key refreshing rates in practical scenarios.
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For example, when using :f #7 in a Doppler shift of 5 de and no LoS between transmitter and
receiver, a 64 bit key can be established in 25.6§. Alternatively, in a vehicular scenario where the

Doppler shift is 100de and the Rician factor is 10, a 128 bit key is established in 1.28§P.

4.2 Improvements and Future Work
The entropy inherent in a wireless channel is present in all the channel parameters. Therefore,
the channel phase is only one possible keying variable. The case of using the phase was
particularly convenient since its uniform distribution allowed uniform quantization. Any function
on the channel parameters should be considered as a key generator. For example, the channel
amplitude of the Rician channel may be used. This amplitude has Rice distribution
ã
! 9 1"
2! 9 1"i ÂÂ!àáâ"Ï
ä
å

S æ2i ç
è
Á !i" 



where  represents the LoS power,

!48"

is the ratio of LoS to scattered power, and S is the zero

order Bessel function of the first kind.
If using a quantization of this amplitude as a key generator, one would need to adjust the
sampling such that the regions in a sampled Rice amplitude distribution would have equal area. In
order to determine where to sample, we must solve this equation for i m+
°â

°ã

Æ Á !i"Ri  Æ Á !i"Ri  é 
S

°â

°êëË

Æ Á !i"Ri

°êëËìâ

!49"

where p§ represents the degree of granularity of the sampling and i m+ represent the sampling
indices.
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The results in this work have been generated with practical intent. It is our hope for the system
analyst to use these results as a guideline for preventing proximity attacks while using the channel
phase to generate keys for a symmetric cipher. Even if the channel has properties outside the range
of those tested here, one may still use the trends we have outlined in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. We have
explained the general trends encountered when varying the environment, quantization bit, and
frequency.
Many improvements could be made to the work here, especially for those with theoretical
interest. One could perform additional simulations for more ISM frequencies, a deeper level of
quantization bits, and a wider and higher resolution sweep of Rician

values. Future work could

also be in the form of gathering more accurate channel statistics through a real world measurement
campaign or through instrumentation which simulates a wireless channel.
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